Física y metafísica en Descartes. Una pregunta a partir de la lectura de Clarke

Abstract

Clarke argues that Descartes’ work should be read as the intelectual production of a practicing scientist who was also interested in metaphysical questions, relegating metaphysics to a second order concern. This proposal has an explanatory limitation, since after 1637 the publication of metaphysics acquires relevance within the intelectual concerns of the Frenchman, so it is complex to approach his work in the terms proposed by Clarke, which does not allow us to understand why a practicing scientist for whom metaphysics represented a secondary concern devoted a significant portion of his time to an elaborate presentation of metaphysics. In the present paper I argue that the importance acquired by the presentation of metaphysics is linked to the further publication of its physics. To demonstrate this, I will review the historical course of Descartes’ work, paying particular attention to the structural change a↵ecting the presentation of his physics after Galileo’s condemnation, i.e., the structural di↵erences between The World and Principles of Philosophy.