La mente agencial: elementos para una teoría de las atribuciones de agencia mental
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/sst.2019.7.4963Palabras clave:
Atribuciones de agencia, agencia motora, agencia mental, deliriosResumen
El concepto de atribución de agencia mental refiere al acto mediante el cual un sujeto asigna agencia a un pensamiento en primera persona. Esta noción nace en filosofía en el contexto de la discusión sobre la forma en que los humanos asignan agencia a sus propios movimientos corporales. Con el fin de contribuir al desarrollo de la discusión en el plano mental, este capítulo describe las dos ofertas teóricas más populares en el debate motor y analiza la forma en que éstas se han adaptado a la dimensión mental. Luego, se elabora una crítica sistemática a la estrategia paralelista que subyace a tal adaptación y, finalmente, se intenta clarificar el explananda para una posible teoría sobre las atribuciones de agencia mental mediante un análisis de las principales propiedades fenoménicas que podrían estar asociadas a la agencialidad del pensamiento
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Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0.