Teorías humeanas y No humeanas: el desacuerdo con respecto a los inobservables

Abstract

Adherence to a Humean or non-Humean position represents a significant choice when proposing a metaphysical theory. This decision is a especially relevant when we ask ourselves about what justifies the postulation of unobservables in this area of philosophy. Unobservables are entities about which we have no direct experience, however, we postúlate their existence for other reasons, generally because of an interest in explaining our experience of the world and its regularities. This essay is situated in the face of this specific disagreement, trying to charactarize both stances in general and analyze what each position would be considering valuable, and valuable for what, when defending their perspective regarding the postulation of unobservables.

This implies a deeper analysis, about how we can rationally discuss about those aspects that we value negatively or positively in the formation of our theoretical proposals and under what meta-theory on the justification of our philosophical theories we adress these questions. Initially, i Will focus on the problem about the unobservables between Humean and non-Humean theories and then show the more general problems that arise when we ask ourselves about the justification of our philosophical positions.